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ABSTRACT 
 
More than 120 countries require or permit the use of International Financial Reporting Standards 
(‘IFRS’) by publicly listed companies on the basis of higher information quality and accounting 
comparability from IFRS application. However, the empirical evidence about these presumed 
benefits are often conflicting and fail to separate between information quality and comparability. 
In this paper we examine the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on firms’ information 
environment. We find that after mandatory IFRS adoption consensus forecast errors decrease for 
firms that mandatorily adopt IFRS relative to forecast errors of other firms. We also find 
decreasing forecast errors for voluntary adopters, but this effect is smaller and not robust. 
Moreover, we show that the magnitude of the forecast errors decrease is associated with the firm-
specific differences between local GAAP and IFRS. This finding suggests that it is IFRS adoption 
rather than a correlated unobservable factor that is causing forecast errors to decrease. Exploiting 
individual analyst level data and isolating settings where analysts would benefit more from either 
increased comparability or higher quality information, we document that the improvement in the 
information environment is driven both by information and comparability effects. These results 
suggest that mandatory IFRS adoption has improved the quality of information intermediation in 
capital markets and as a result firms’ information environment by increasing both information 
quality and accounting comparability. 
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1.  Introduction 
According to proponents of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) publicly traded 
companies must apply a single set of high quality accounting standards in order to contribute to 
better functioning capital markets (Quigley 2007). Therefore, mandatory IFRS adoption has the 
potential to facilitate cross-border comparability, increase reporting transparency, decrease 
information costs, reduce information asymmetry, and thereby increase the liquidity, 
competitiveness, and efficiency of markets (Ball 2006; Choi and Meek 2005).  
These potential benefits rely on the presumption that mandatory IFRS adoption provides 
superior information to market participants and/or increased accounting comparability compared 
to previous accounting regimes. However, there is little and often conflicting empirical evidence 
that this is the case. Moreover, while all of these potential benefits provide a persuasive argument 
for IFRS adoption, the costs associated with such a transition cannot be ignored. For example, Ball 
(2006) notes that the fair value orientation of IFRS could add volatility to financial statements. 
This volatility takes the form of both good and bad information; the latter consisting of noise that 
arises from inherent estimation error and possible managerial manipulation.  
Whether harmonization will actually be achieved is also currently up for debate with 
many commentators arguing that the same accounting standards can be implemented differently 
(Kvaal and Nobes 2010; Schipper 2005). In the absence of suitable enforcement mechanisms, real 
convergence and harmonisation is unlikely to happen (Ball 2006). Cultural, political, and business 
differences might continue to impose significant obstacles in the progress towards this single 
global financial communication system (Armstrong, Barth, Jagolinzer, and Riedl 2010; 
Soderstrom and Sun 2007) and incentives might continue to dominate the potential effects of 
accounting standards (Bradshaw and Miller 2007; Lang, Raedy, and Wilson 2006). 
Notwithstanding high quality standards, there is still a risk of having relatively low quality Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1264101
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accounting numbers when firms have incentives and opportunities to manipulate their financial 
statements (Leuz 2003). 
In this paper, we investigate which attributes of IFRS cause an improvement in the 
information environment of firms. Prior and contemporaneous studies investigating the impact of 
IFRS on analysts’ forecasting ability have generally found that analyst forecast errors significantly 
reduced following voluntary adoption of IFRS (Ashbaugh and Pincus 2001; Ernstberger, Krotter, 
and Stadler 2008; Hodgdon, Tondkar, Harless, and Adhikari 2008; Bae, Tan, and Welker 2008) 
and for certain groups under mandatory adoption of IFRS (Wang, Young, and Zhuang 2008; 
Byard, Li, and Yu 2011; Preiato, Brown, and Tarca 2009; Cotter, Tarca, and Wee 2010; Tan, 
Wang, and Welker 2009; Glaum, Baetge, Grothe, and Oberdoerster 2011). However, it is difficult 
to establish from these results the actual causes for such improvements. The question arises: what 
is it about IFRS adoption that leads to an increase in forecast accuracy? In this paper, we test 
whether the increase in forecast accuracy can be attributed to higher quality information and/or 
greater comparability from IFRS adoption, or simply that IFRS gives managers greater 
opportunities to manipulate their earnings and hence meet analysts’ forecasts.  
We find that after mandatory IFRS adoption forecast accuracy and other measures of the 
quality of the information environment increase significantly more for mandatory adopters relative 
to non-adopters and voluntary adopters. Unlike prior studies, we do not find that voluntary 
adopters benefit significantly more from mandating IFRS compared to mandatory adopters 
(Daske, Hail, Leuz, and Verdi 2008). To isolate the effect of mandatory adoption we control for 
time-varying and persistent unobservable firm characteristics that affect forecast accuracy. We 
also control for industry-year and country-year effects to mitigate any industry and countrywide 
changes in forecast accuracy. The results are robust to alternative dependent variables, alternative 
samples of control firms, and forecast horizon choices.   4 
We also hold constant any information effects from IFRS adoption and find that the 
increase in forecast accuracy is partly driven by comparability benefits. We establish this result by 
analysing three groups of analysts. First, analysts covering firms that report under a single local 
GAAP before mandatory adoption (for example all firms report under UK GAAP), but after 
mandatory adoption some firms switch to IFRS while other firms continue to report under local 
GAAP. For these analysts, we expect accounting comparability to decrease. Second, analysts 
covering firms that report under a single local GAAP before mandatory adoption and after 
mandatory adoption all firms switch to IFRS. For these analysts, we expect accounting 
comparability to remain the same. Third, analysts covering firms that report under multiple local 
GAAP before mandatory adoption (for example some firms use UK GAAP and other firms use 
Spanish GAAP), but after mandatory adoption all firms switch to IFRS. For these analysts, we 
expect accounting comparability to increase. We expect that, if information effects exist for 
mandatory adopters, all three groups of analysts are going to benefit. To eliminate the possibility 
that an analyst’s choice to change firm coverage affects the results, we include in the analysis only 
mandatory adopters that the analyst is covering both before and after mandatory adoption. 
Consistent with the presence of a comparability benefit from IFRS adoption, forecast accuracy 
improves more for analysts with portfolios that move from Local GAAP to IFRS compared to 
Local GAAP to Multiple GAAP. Moreover, this effect is even greater for analysts with portfolios 
that move from Multiple GAAP to IFRS. 
Furthermore, we hold constant any comparability effects from IFRS adoption and find 
that the increase in forecast accuracy is partly driven by information benefits. We consider 
analysts covering firms that report under multiple local GAAP before mandatory adoption and 
after mandatory adoption all the firms covered switch to IFRS. From the portfolios of those 
analysts, we select voluntary and mandatory adopters that these analysts cover both before and 
after mandatory adoption. We expect that if IFRS increases information quality then forecast   5 
accuracy should improve more for mandatory than for voluntary adopters. We assume that for 
these analysts comparability effects will be present for both mandatory and voluntary adopters. 
We find results consistent with this information quality effect. For this set of analyst-firm pairs 
forecast accuracy improves more for mandatory adopters. 
In addition, we find that forecast accuracy improves more for firms with accounting 
treatments that differ the most from IFRS. This finding provides some confidence that it is IFRS 
adoption that causes this change in forecast accuracy rather than a correlated omitted variable. We 
interpret this result as being consistent with those firms with the largest deviation of accounting 
practices from IFRS prior to mandatory adoption benefiting more from comparability and 
information benefits (Horton and Serafeim 2010; Beuselinck, Joos, and Van der Meulen 2010; 
Brochet, Jagolinzer, and Riedl 2011).  
However, an alternative explanation of this result is that the reconciliation component 
captures the increased opportunities for managers to use the additional accruals adjustments 
allowed under IFRS to manipulate their earnings in order to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. We 
do not find evidence consistent with this explanation. Moreover, when we consider whether the 
increase in forecast accuracy is driven primarily by mandatory adopters with more opportunities to 
manipulate their earnings, such as firms with larger accruals or firms that analysts do not forecast 
cash flows, we do not find any evidence in support of this claim. 
We make a number of contributions to the existing literature. First, our study contributes 
to the literature on the consequences of disclosure by examining the effect of mandatory IFRS 
adoption on analysts (Ashbaugh and Pincus 2001; Wang et al. 2008; Tan et al. 2009) and on the 
information environment (Lang, Lins, and Miller 2003). We also add to the previous literature by 
documenting a larger improvement in the information environment for mandatory adopters 
relative to voluntary adopters and non-adopters (Daske et al. 2008) and find that this improvement 
is associated with the firm’s earnings reconciliation adjustment.   6 
Second, by providing evidence that the increase in forecast accuracy appears to be driven 
both by information and comparability effects, we contribute to the growing body of literature that 
directly investigates the comparability benefits (Bielstein, Munter, and Schinas 2007; Daske et al. 
2008; DeFond, Hu, Hung, and Li 2011) and information benefits of IFRS (Ashbaugh and Pincus 
2001; Barth, Landsman, and Lang 2008; Horton and Serafeim 2010). Finally, by offering evidence 
that the increase in forecast accuracy appears not driven by manipulation, we also contribute to the 
debate on the role of incentives and whether managers exercise their judgement opportunistically 
when implementing IFRS (Leuz 2003; Ball, Robin, and Wu 2003; Christensen, Lee, and Walker 
2009; Chen, Tang, Jiang, and Lin 2010). 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and 
presents the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research design. Section 4 presents the sample 
selection process and summary statistics. Section 5 presents the results and section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Literature review and motivation 
Background: IFRS adoption 
Countries with prominent capital markets, such as Australia, European Union (EU) members, 
Hong Kong, Philippines, and South Africa, require publicly traded companies (with certain 
exceptions) to present consolidated financial statements in conformity with IFRS for each 
financial year starting on or after January 1, 2005. Other countries, such as Japan, have decided to 
adopt IFRS in the future and already allow companies to voluntarily report under IFRS.  
  While mandatory adoption of IFRS was widespread in 2005, there are still firms that 
follow other accounting standards. In countries such as the United States, Mexico, China, 
Malaysia, and Brazil, firms were not allowed to use IFRS. In other countries, certain firms were 
exempt from IFRS adoption. For example, in the United Kingdom, companies listed in the 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM) were not subject to the EU International Accounting   7 
Standards (IAS) Regulation. The AIM had adopted a rule that required AIM firms to submit 
financial statements prepared using IFRS for periods beginning on or after January 1, 2007, 
although voluntary adoption was allowed.  Swiss firms that are not multinationals are also exempt 
from IFRS compliance.
 1 These companies may continue to use Swiss GAAP, or they may choose 
IFRS or U.S. GAAP. In addition, the IAS Regulation is only applicable to consolidated accounts 
and many investment trusts that only publish parent accounts are by their very nature exempt. 
Companies reporting under IFRS can be split into voluntary and mandatory adopters. The first 
group includes all companies that adopted IFRS before 2005, while the latter group consists of 
firms that were forced to adopt IFRS. As a result, there are three distinct groups of firms: (i) ‘non-
IFRS adopters’ that exploit the exemptions and choose not to report under IFRS or that are listed 
in countries where IFRS is not allowed; (ii) ‘mandatory adopters’ that only adopt when they are 
forced to comply; and (iii) ‘voluntary adopters’ that choose to comply with IFRS in the period 
before the regulatory rules demanded IFRS adoption.  
Although earlier studies on ‘voluntary adopters’ provide valuable evidence about the 
effects of IFRS adoption, these results may not be generalizable in the current mandatory setting 
(Daske et al. 2008; Horton and Serafeim 2010). We expect any effects from IFRS mandatory 
adoption to be different from those documented for voluntary IFRS adopters (Ashbaugh and 
Pincus 2001; Bae et al. 2008; Guan, Hope, and Kang 2006) since the former group is essentially 
forced to adopt IFRS compared to the latter that chooses to adopt. For example, past research finds 
that the decision to voluntarily adopt IFRS reporting is only one element of a broader strategy that 
increases a firm’s overall commitment to transparency (Daske et al. 2008; Leuz and Verrecchia 
2000). Therefore, any effects around voluntary IFRS adoptions cannot be attributed solely to IFRS 
                                                 
1Switzerland is not a member of the EU and therefore is not subject to the EU IAS Regulation. The Swiss Foundation for 
Accounting and Reporting publishes accounting standards. Compliance with Swiss GAAP is required for all companies, 
however compliance with IFRS ensures compliance with Swiss GAAP  and many large Swiss companies have, for a 
number of years, followed IASs/IFRS. However, starting with annual reports for 2005 and interim reports for 2006, most 
Swiss companies whose equity shares are listed on the main board of the Swiss Exchange were required to prepare their 
financial statements using either IFRS or U.S. GAAP.    8 
compliance. Moreover, in a mandatory setting, firms are more likely to be affected by reporting 
externalities; for example, disclosure by one firm being useful in valuing other firms through intra-
industry information transfers. In contrast, in a voluntary setting there are fewer firms disclosing 
and therefore such externalities may be moderate. 
 
Information environment and research analysts 
Our approach follows prior research
2 that uses the characteristics of analyst forecasts as a proxy 
for the information environment. In particular, we focus on the accuracy of analyst forecasts. 
Previous studies suggest that more accurate forecasts indicate a firm with a better information 
environment. Lang and Lundholm (1996) find that firms with better disclosure have lower analyst 
forecast errors. Hope (2003) finds that countries with better disclosure policies and enforcement 
have higher analyst forecast accuracy. Similarly, we view changes in forecast errors as indicative 
of changes in a firm’s information environment.  
 
Analyst forecasts and IFRS 
The studies investigating the effects of voluntary adoption of IFRS find an improvement in the 
information environment of analysts (Ashbaugh and Pincus 2001; Ernstberger et al. 2008; 
Hodgdon et al. 2008; Bae et al. 2008). In contrast, recent studies investigating the effect of 
mandatory IFRS adoption on the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts have produced inconclusive 
results. The overall findings suggest improvements in forecast accuracy for some European and 
Australian firms after IFRS adoption (Wang et al. 2008; Byard et al. 2011; Preiato et al. 2009; 
Cotter et al. 2010; Tan et al. 2009). Byard et al. (2011) find an increase in the forecast accuracy, 
but only for those firms that were domiciled in countries with both strong enforcement regimes 
and domestic accounting standards that differed significantly from IFRS. Tan et al. (2009) find 
                                                 
2 See for example Lang and Lundholm (1996), Healy et al. (1999), Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001) and Lang et 
al. (2003).   9 
that forecast accuracy improves post-IFRS for foreign analysts, but not for domestic analysts. 
However, both Cotter et al. (2010) and Tan et al. (2009) find no evidence that the change in 
accuracy is increasing in the number of accounting differences between the firm’s home GAAP 
and IFRS.
3 Glaum et al. (2011) find that although the quality of disclosure improves after IFRS 
adoption, this finding explains only a small proportion of the overall improvement in forecast 
accuracy. While it is unclear exactly which attributes of IFRS reporting are driving this increase in 
analysts’ forecast accuracy, the two most frequently claimed benefits associated with IFRS 
adoption are (i) an increase in accounting comparability and (ii) an increase in information quality. 
 
Comparability benefits 
A major potential benefit from the global move towards IFRS is an increase in accounting 
comparability. However, many commentators question the potential for IFRS to increase 
comparability because the same accounting standards can be implemented differently and in the 
absence of suitable enforcement mechanisms real convergence and harmonization is unlikely (Ball 
2006). 
Prior research has shown that as a firm’s GAAP moves closer to foreign investors’ or 
analysts’ home GAAP this reduces investors’ home bias (Bradshaw, Bushee, and Miller 2004; 
Covrig, DeFond, and Hung 2007; Yu 2010) and improves the efficiency of information 
intermediaries (Bae et al. 2008; Bradshaw, Miller, and Serafeim 2010). Tan et al. (2009) find that 
after mandatory IFRS adoption foreign analysts’ following increases significantly more for those 
firms who had the greatest level of GAAP divergence. Yu (2010) finds mandatory IFRS adoption 
increases cross-border equity holdings for those firms where the divergence was greatest prior to 
IFRS.  
                                                 
3 With respect to voluntary IFRS adopters, Bae et al. (2008) find for a sample of foreign analysts a negative relationship 
between GAAP differences and forecast accuracy, although this association is sensitive to the model specification.   10 
These findings appear at first to support the argument that IFRS adoption increases 
comparability, but arguably what these studies actually capture is familiarity rather than 
comparability (Bradshaw et al. 2004).  A number of recent studies have attempted to directly test 
whether IFRS adoption increases comparability. The results are mixed. DeFond, Hu, Hung, and Li 
(2011), measuring comparability in terms of an increase in uniformity (Bielstein et al. 2007), find 
that mandatory IFRS adoption results in a greater increase in foreign investment for firms in 
countries with strong implementation credibility and an increase in comparability. Daske et al. 
(2008) find capital market benefits arising from mandating IFRS are most pronounced for firms 
that voluntarily adopted IFRS. This suggests possible comparability benefits but their subsequent 
analysis does not provide any support for this argument.  
Other studies argue and find that cultural, political, and business differences continue to 
impose significant obstacles to increasing the comparability of accounting information. Cascino 
and Gassen (2010) find that pre-IFRS practices continue after mandatory adoption in Germany 
and Italy. Beneish, Miller, and Yohn (2010) find that mandatory IFRS adoption increases cross-
border debt but not equity investments; this suggests that IFRS provides no comparability benefits 
in the equity markets.  Lang, Maffett, and Owens (2010) find that accounting comparability does 
not improve for IFRS adopters relative to a control group of non-adopters and conclude that there 
is little evidence that IFRS adoption increases comparability.   
Therefore, the empirical question remains as to whether the improvement in the information 
environment of analysts documented in prior literature is due to an increase in comparability. This 
leads to our first hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS 1.  Mandatory IFRS adoption provides comparability benefits and as a result 
affects analyst earnings forecast accuracy for firms adopting IFRS mandatorily. 
 
Information benefits   11 
Past research has shown that higher quality reporting reduces adverse selection in securities 
markets (Welker 1995; Healy et al. 1999; Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia 2007), reduces cost of 
capital (Botosan 1997; Hail and Leuz 2006), and improves the efficiency of information 
intermediaries (Lang and Lundholm 1996; Healy et al. 1999; Hope 2003). If IFRS are higher 
quality standards and provide better information then IFRS adoption has the potential to generate 
the above benefits. However, prior research has provided mixed evidence as to whether IFRS 
numbers are of higher quality relative to those associated with the application of domestic GAAP 
(Leuz and Wysocki 2008). Barth et al. (2008) find that firms’ reporting quality increases after 
voluntary IFRS adoption. Horton and Serafeim (2010) find that IFRS reconciliations provide new 
information to investors even for firms that have already reported their performance under a high 
quality accounting regime (UK GAAP). Beuselinck et al. (2010) show that stock price 
synchronicity decreases after mandatory IFRS adoption, but this effect is temporary. Landsman, 
Maydew, and Thornock (2011) find that the information content of earnings announcement 
increases after adopting IFRS mandatorily, but only when using abnormal return volatility to 
proxy for information content rather than abnormal volume. Kim and Li (2010) find following 
mandatory IFRS an increase in intra-industry information transfer, particularly for those 
announcers with local GAAP diverging significantly from IFRS. 
Various other studies fail to find strong evidence that IFRS improves the information set of 
investors and find limited or no capital market benefits for mandatory adopters. Daske et al. 
(2008) show that capital market benefits around mandatory adoption of IFRS are unlikely to exist 
primarily because of IFRS adoption. Daske (2006) finds no evidence that IFRS adoption decreases 
a firm’s cost of capital. Atwood, Drake, Myers, and Myers (2011) find that earnings reported 
under IFRS are no more or less persistent and are no more or less associated with future cash 
flows than earnings reported under local GAAP.     12 
Therefore, the empirical question remains as to whether the improvement in the information 
environment of analysts documented in prior literature is due to an increase in information quality. 
This leads to our second hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS 2. Mandatory IFRS adoption provides information quality benefits and as a 
result affects analyst earnings forecast accuracy for firms adopting IFRS 
mandatorily. 
 
Incentives and manipulation 
A stream of research argues that a firm’s reporting incentives, and not accounting standards, is the 
primary factor that determines the informativeness of accounting statements (Ball, Kothari, and 
Robin 2000). As a result, if incentives do not change after IFRS adoption, mandating IFRS will 
have no effect on the information environment. 
Opponents of IFRS argue that IFRS has increased managerial flexibility and discretion 
especially due to the lack of implementation guidance and poor enforcement (Ahmed, Neel, and 
Wang 2010; Ball et al. 2003; Leuz 2003). Consistent with the importance of incentives, 
Christensen et al. (2008) find that incentives dominate standards in determining accounting quality 
around mandatory IFRS adoption. Following mandatory IFRS in Germany, Paananen (2008) and 
Paananen and Lin (2007) both find a decrease in financial reporting quality, an increase in 
earnings management, and a reduction in timeliness of loss recognition. Jeanjean and Stolowy 
(2008) find no decline in the pervasiveness of earnings management in Austria and the United 
Kingdom and find an increase in France. Both Ahmed et al. (2010) and Chen et al. (2010) find 
evidence of income smoothing and a reduction in timeliness of loss recognition following 
mandatory IFRS. However, contrary to Chen et al. (2010), Ahmed et al. (2010) find a significant 
increase in aggressive reporting of some accruals and no reduction in the management of earnings 
towards a target. Prior studies therefore suggest that there are increased opportunities for earnings   13 
management following IFRS. As a result, the documented increase in analysts’ forecast accuracy 
could be a consequence of managers having more opportunities to manage their earnings towards 
analyst forecasts. Prior studies document that firms manage earnings towards a target (Bannister 
and Newman 1996; Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser 1999; Matsumoto 2002; Abarbanell and 
Lehavy 2003; Hutton 2005). This leads to our third hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS 3. The increase in forecast accuracy following mandatory IFRS is 
associated with increased opportunities for firms to manage earnings towards a 
target.  
 
3.  Research design 
 
Forecast accuracy 
To test our three hypotheses we first need to verify that the adoption of IFRS improves the 
information environment for the firms in our sample. Specifically, we test for differences in 
forecast errors before and after IFRS mandatory compliance for non-adopters, mandatory 
adopters, and voluntary adopters.  We include voluntary adopters following the results of Byard et 
al. (2011) and Daske et al. (2008). Voluntary adopters, under this new mandatory setting, may 
benefit from positive externalities in terms of an increase in comparability and disclosure (Coffee 
1984; Lambert et al. 2007; Daske et al. 2008). Following the mandatory adoption, there is now a 
larger pool in which intra-industry information transfers could take place. This could improve the 
information environment of voluntary adopters (Foster 1980; Ramnath 2002; Gleason, Jenkins, 
and Johnson 2008). Moreover, disclosure theory suggests that an increase in mandatory disclosure 
is paralleled by an increase in the incentives to voluntary disclosure; in other words, there is a 
‘race to the top’ (Dye 1986, 1990). 
Consistent with Daske et al. (2008), we control for the impact of potentially confounding 
events using non-adopting firms as our control sample. Any change in forecast accuracy for non-  14 
adopters will likely reflect the impact of concurrent economic and regulatory changes, but not the 
impact of mandatory IFRS adoption. I/B/E/S reports 12 consensus forecasts each year for a firm. 
We choose the consensus forecast that is calculated three months before fiscal year-end to ensure 
that analysts have adequate information generated by IFRS reporting to affect their forecast 
accuracy. We later use other consensus forecasts to assess the robustness of our results to the 
choice of forecast horizon. To test for the effect of IFRS adoption we use the following research 
design: 


  
  
n
a k
it k t i
t i t it
controls Mandatory IFRS Mandatory
Mandatory IFRS Voluntary Mandatory FE
  
  
*
*
3
2 1 0
       (1) 
We define FEit as the forecast error for firm i and year t. Forecast error is the absolute difference 
between actual earnings and consensus forecast, deflated by absolute actual earnings.
4  Voluntary 
IFRSi is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if firm i adopted IFRS before IFRS was 
mandated. Mandatory IFRSi is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if firm i adopted 
IFRS after IFRS was mandated. Mandatoryt is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for 
years after 2005 (after 2003 for Singapore). β1 captures the effect on firms that did not adopt IFRS, 
β1 + β2 captures the effect on firms that voluntarily adopted IFRS early and β1 + β3 captures the 
effect on firms that adopted IFRS mandatorily. 
Model (1) includes only firms that have available data for periods both before and after 
the mandatory IFRS adoption. Previous research (Clement 1999; Duru and Reeb 2002; Bradshaw 
et al. 2010) suggests various factors that might affect forecast errors. We use these variables as 
controls in model (1). Control variables include 1) the level of absolute accruals, 2) analyst 
coverage, 3) the logarithm of the market value of the firm’s equity, 4) reporting negative income, 
                                                 
4 Following the findings of Cotter et al. 2010, we use absolute actual earnings rather than stock price as a deflator. Cotter et 
al. 2010 note in their study that using share price as the deflator meant it was not possible to rule our confounding effects 
since they acknowledge that their sample period 2003–07 included a period of high growth from 2004–06 followed by a 
severe decline from 2007 onwards. However, in unreported results we did use alternative deflators such as stock price and 
all the results were similar. We also find similar results if we do not deflate the forecast errors. Thus, the choice of deflator 
does not appear to be driving the results.   15 
and 5) forecast horizon (defined as the number of days between the forecast’s issue date and the 
fiscal year end). We also include indicator variables for firms that report under U.S. GAAP or for 
firms that trade an ADR in the United States. We include the average forecast error, excluding the 
forecast error of the focal firm, of all firms in the same country-year and industry-year in model 
(1) to control for industry and countrywide time-varying effects. Moreover, we include firm fixed 
effects to control for persistent firm differences across the three groups of firms. We double cluster 
standard errors at the firm and at the year level to mitigate serial correlation within a firm or cross-
correlation among firms within a year. 
To increase our confidence that it is IFRS adoption that causes the increase in forecast 
accuracy we also examine whether the firm-specific differences between IFRS and local GAAP 
earnings, captured in the firm’s reconciliation document, are associated with the change in forecast 
accuracy following mandatory IFRS adoption. If IFRS adoption results in greater information 
quality and/or comparability then a priori those firms with the largest deviation of accounting 
practice from IFRS should have the most to gain from the transition to IFRS (Horton and Serafeim 
2010; Beuselinck et al. 2010; Brochet et al. 2011). 
We use as a proxy for the differences between local GAAP and IFRS a firm-level 
measure of the actual reported reconciliation component between IFRS and local GAAP earnings.
5 
This is available because firms were required in the first year of IFRS adoption to report the 
reconciliation between their last reported local GAAP accounts and IFRS. Therefore, we calculate 
the absolute difference between the firm’s local GAAP earnings for 2004 and the reconciled IFRS 
earnings for 2004, as a percentage of absolute local GAAP earnings.
6 
 
                                                 
5 One limitation of this proxy is that while we are able to capture the recognition and measurement differences within the 
reconciliation number, we are not able to capture disclosure differences which might also be associated with forecast 
accuracy. For example, segmental reporting disclosures pre and post, related party transaction pre and post etc.  
6 We find similar results if we scale the reconciliation amount with the market value of equity at the previous fiscal year-
end.   16 
Comparability and/or information effects 
Comparability effects 
To test Hypothesis 1 and investigate the possibility of comparability effects of IFRS adoption we 
split the analyst sample into three groups. The first group is Local GAAP to IFRS that includes 
only analysts with portfolios consisting of firms that followed a single local GAAP prior to IFRS 
and then all switched to IFRS. For example, an analyst follows only firms whose financial 
statements use Spanish GAAP until 2004 and then they all switch to IFRS. We believe that for this 
subset of analysts comparability effects are negligible because these analysts focused on numbers 
generated by a single set of accounting principles both before and after mandatory IFRS adoption. 
The second group is Multiple GAAP to IFRS that includes only analysts with portfolios consisting 
of firms following different local GAAPs prior to IFRS (for example, some firms use French 
GAAP and others use German GAAP) and then all firms switched to IFRS. We believe that for 
this subset of analysts comparability increases because these analysts focused on numbers 
generated by different accounting principles before mandatory IFRS adoption but only from one 
set of accounting standards after mandatory adoption. The last group is Local GAAP to Multiple 
GAAP that includes analysts with portfolios including firms following a single local GAAP prior 
to IFRS and after mandatory IFRS some firms adopted IFRS and other firms continued to follow 
their local GAAP. We believe that for this subset of analysts comparability diminishes because 
these analysts focused on numbers generated from one set of accounting standards before 
mandatory IFRS adoption but from multiple sets of accounting standards after mandatory 
adoption.
7 To hold information effects relatively homogeneous across the three groups of analysts 
we include in the analysis only forecasts made for mandatory adopters. We therefore exclude 
                                                 
7 Embedded in the analysis is the assumption that analysts focus on specific stocks and therefore a change in accounting 
standards might increase, decrease, or have no effect on accounting comparability for an individual analyst (depending on 
the composition of the analyst’s portfolio).    17 
voluntary adopters since the incremental information benefits following mandatory adoption are 
likely to be different than for firms implementing IFRS for the first time. 
Moreover, to mitigate any selection bias that arises from analysts’ choice to change 
coverage we restrict the analysis to firms that an analyst covers both before and after mandatory 
IFRS adoption. Control variables used in equation (1) are also included and we incorporate four 
additional variables to control for the individual analyst’s attributes; for example, analyst’s 
experience, number of firms covered, number of industries covered, and the size of the brokerage 
house they work for. This yields the following research design: 
ijt
n
a k
k
t j t j
t j j ijt
controls
Mandatory IFRS to GAAP Multiple Mandatory IFRS to GAAP Local
Mandatory IFRS to GAAP Multiple IFRS to GAAP Local FE
 
 
   
 

    


* * 5 4
3 2 1 0
   (2) 
We define FEijt  as the forecast error for firm i, analyst j, and year t. Local GAAP to IFRSj is an 
indicator variable and takes a value of one if analyst’s j portfolio only includes firms reporting 
under the same GAAP prior to IFRS. Multiple GAAP to IFRSj is an indicator variable and takes a 
value of one if analyst’s j portfolio only includes firms reporting under different GAAPs prior to 
IFRS. If the increase in forecast accuracy is caused by greater comparability then we expect β4 to 
be negative and significant and β5 to be even more negative and significant. 
 
Information effects 
To test Hypothesis 2 and investigate the potential information effects of IFRS adoption we focus 
on the analyst group Multiple GAAP to IFRS. However, this time we use both the mandatory and 
the voluntary adopters. We expect that for this group of analysts comparability effects are present 
for both mandatory and voluntary adopters, but information effects are stronger for mandatory 
adopters if IFRS increases information quality. If voluntary adopters improve their level of 
disclosure substantially (Dye 1986) following mandatory IFRS adoption, then this introduces bias   18 
against the hypothesis. We also include all the control variables used in the comparability test 
above. 
ijt
n
a k
k t i
t i ijt
controls Mandatory IFRS Mandatory
Mandatory IFRS Mandatory FE
  
  
  
  


* 3
2 1 0
  (3) 
If the increase in forecast accuracy is caused by an increase in information quality then we expect 
β3 to be negative and significant. 
 
Manipulation effects 
To test Hypothesis 3 and investigate whether earnings manipulation can explain the predicted 
increase in forecast accuracy we estimate a number of models. The first model tests whether 
forecast accuracy improves more for mandatory adopters that have large absolute accruals. 
Accruals provide managers with discretion and allow them to alter the inter-temporal pattern of 
profit (Healy 1985). Second, we extend the model to test whether forecast accuracy improves 
more for mandatory adopters where analysts do not forecast cash flows. Prior studies find that 
firms followed by analysts who issue both earnings and cash flow forecasts exhibit lower levels of 
earnings management (DeFond and Hung 2003; McInnis and Collins 2010).  Control variables 
used in equation (1) are also included. 
ijt
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t i t it
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Accruals Absolute Mandatory IFRS Voluntary Accruals Absolute
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(4)
 
where Absolute Accrualsit is the absolute difference between net income and cash flow, deflated 
by total assets, for firm i and year t.  If the increase in forecast accuracy is caused by earnings 
management then β6 should be negative and significant.   19 
Finally, we examine if firms that now have more accruals under IFRS are more likely to 
meet or just beat analyst forecasts (MTBTit). We employ the firm-specific reconciliation 
adjustment to capture the increased opportunities for firms to manipulate their earnings to meet 
analysts’ forecasts. This change in accruals caused by IFRS adoption is captured in the firm’s 
earnings reconciliation; for example, large reconciliation adjustment firms have high discretion 
and small reconciliation adjustment firms have low discretion. If IFRS adopters with the greatest 
discretion are managing their earnings then we should observe a higher probability for these firms 
meeting or just beating analysts’ forecasts after IFRS adoption. Control variables used in equation 
(1) are also included. 


 
  
n
a k
it k
t i t it
controls
Mandatory Difference GAAP Mandatory MTBT
 
   * 2 1 0
  (5) 
where MTBTit is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if for firm i and year t the 
realized earnings are equal to or greater than the analyst’s consensus forecast by one cent per 
share. If the increase in forecast accuracy is caused by earnings management then β2 should be 
positive and significant. 
 
4.  Sample and descriptive statistics 
Sample selection 
The sample covers firms from all countries with I/B/E/S coverage and fiscal years ending on or 
after December 31, 2001 through December 31, 2007. We start by identifying all firms covered in 
I/B/E/S. We include only firms with I/B/E/S coverage both before and after IFRS adoption. We 
review annual reports to classify firms according to the accounting standards they are following 
and manually code each firm as adopting IFRS early (‘voluntary adopters’), adopting IFRS 
mandatorily (‘mandatory adopters’), or continuing to report under other GAAP after 2005 (‘non-
adopters’).   20 
This procedure yields in total 8,124 unique firms, of which 2,235 adopt IFRS for the first 
time mandatorily, and 635 firms had voluntarily adopted IFRS. Table 1 provides a breakdown of 
the sample into the number of firms and observations by country and by the accounting standards 
followed. The majority of mandatory adopters come from Australia, France, Singapore, Sweden, 
Hong Kong, and the United Kingdom. The majority of voluntary adopters are incorporated in 
Germany, Italy, and Switzerland. The composition of the sample is broadly consistent with Daske 
et al. (2008). 
[Insert Table 1] 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 2, panel A reports summary statistics for the total sample. The mean and median deflated 
(un-deflated) forecast errors are 0.334 (2.873) and 0.107 (0.140), respectively. Mean forecast 
dispersion, consensus, common precision, and idiosyncratic precision are 0.148, 0.585, 113, and 
191 respectively. We measure consensus, common precision, and idiosyncratic precision 
consistent with Barron, Byard, and Kim (2002). Consensus is a measure of the commonality of 
beliefs among different analysts. Common precision is the inverse of the uncertainty in the 
information that is common across all analysts. Idiosyncratic precision is the inverse of 
uncertainty in the information that is idiosyncratic to each analyst. Mean and median analyst 
coverage is 7.4 and 5, respectively. The forecast horizon is approximately 74 days.  
  Table 2, panel B reports summary statistics for voluntary adopters, mandatory adopters, 
and non-adopters. Voluntary adopters are larger than mandatory adopters and have higher analyst 
coverage. The level of absolute accruals is similar across the two groups. Voluntary adopters 
report losses more frequently than mandatory adopters. Non-adopters are moderately larger and 
have the same analyst coverage as mandatory adopters. The level of absolute accruals is also very 
similar to the level of absolute accruals for mandatory and voluntary adopters. The same is true for 
non-adopters excluding U.S. firms or including only firms from countries that mandated IFRS.   21 
Frequency of loss reporting for non-adopters is similar to frequency of loss reporting by 
mandatory adopters when U.S. firms are excluded. 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
5.  Results 
Effect of mandatory IFRS adoption 
Varying the sample 
Table 3 presents the estimated coefficients from multivariate regressions for different samples. We 
find that forecast accuracy improves significantly after mandatory IFRS adoption for mandatory 
and voluntary adopters relative to firms that do not adopt IFRS (column (1)). This improvement is 
significant at the 1 percent level for mandatory adopters and at the 10 percent for voluntary 
adopters. Column (2) excludes U.S. firms to assess the robustness of the results when the control 
group does not include U.S. firms. Forecast accuracy again improves for mandatory adopters, but 
accuracy for voluntary adopters does not significantly improve. Column (3) excludes forecasts 
made for 2005, the first year of mandatory IFRS adoption, because in 2005 there was still little 
information generated from IFRS adoption. We find significant decrease in forecast errors both for 
mandatory and voluntary adopters. Column (4) excludes forecasts made for 2001 and 2002. For 
these two years, the economy was in a recession. In contrast, for all the other years in the sample 
the economy was growing. Therefore, eliminating forecasts for 2001 and 2002 makes the periods 
before and after mandatory IFRS adoption more comparable in terms of economic conditions. 
Forecast accuracy improves for mandatory adopters, but accuracy for voluntary adopters does not 
significantly improve. Estimating the model only on the countries that mandate IFRS produces 
similar results, with forecast accuracy improving only for mandatory adopters (column (5)). 
Finally, column (6) excludes firms from Singapore as it was the only country that mandated IFRS 
before 2005. Forecast accuracy improves significantly after mandatory IFRS adoption for   22 
mandatory adopters and marginally significantly for voluntary IFRS adopters. The coefficient on 
Mandatory IFRS * Mandatory is statistically greater than the coefficient on Voluntary IFRS * 
Mandatory at the 10 percent level in columns (1), (2), (4), and (6). This result suggests that the 
decrease in forecast errors is reliably greater for mandatory adopters relative to voluntary adopters 
under most specifications, although the level of statistical significance is moderate. The economic 
effect is approximately a 15 percent decrease in forecast errors for mandatory adopters relative to 
non-adopters. 
[Insert Table 3] 
Varying the measurement of the information environment 
Table 4 estimates the same model but uses different dependent variables. The first column uses the 
un-deflated absolute difference between forecast and actual earnings. We use this alternative 
dependent variable to ensure that the results are not driven by the choice of the deflator. We find 
that forecast accuracy improves significantly after mandatory IFRS adoption for mandatory and 
voluntary IFRS adopters relative to firms that do not adopt IFRS (column (1)). This improvement 
is significant at the 1 percent level for mandatory adopters and significant at the 10 percent for 
voluntary adopters. Column (2) uses as dependent variable forecast dispersion divided by absolute 
actual earnings. Forecast dispersion declines significantly for both mandatory and voluntary 
adopters. This result might reflect an increase in the consensus across analysts and/or increased 
precision in forecasting (Barron, Kim, Lim, and Stevens 1998). To disentangle those two effects, 
we estimate the effect of IFRS reporting on analyst consensus (Barron, Bryard, and Kim 2002). 
Consensus decreases significantly for mandatory adopters relative to other firms (column (3)). 
This is contrary to the findings of Beuselinck et al. (2010), who find no change in the consensus.
8 
Consensus remains unchanged relative to other firms for voluntary adopters. Idiosyncratic and 
common precision increase for mandatory and voluntary adopters after mandatory IFRS adoption 
                                                 
8 These results potentially differ as the sample in Beuselinck et al. (2010) is significantly smaller and the analysis does not 
control for time varying industry and country effects, and firm fixed effects.   23 
(columns (4) and (5)).
9 The decrease in consensus for mandatory adopters can be explained by the 
higher increase in idiosyncratic precision compared to common precision.
10 
[Insert Table 4] 
Varying the forecast horizon 
Table 5 examines the robustness of the results to the choice of forecast horizon. Tables 3 and 4 use 
forecasts with an average horizon of about 70 days. Table 5 shows results using forecasts with 
horizons of 40, 100, 160 or 220 days. Overall, we find that forecast accuracy improves 
significantly more for mandatory adopters relative to other firms. Across all specifications, 
forecast accuracy improves more for mandatory adopters relative to non-adopters and the 
estimated effect is significant at the 1 percent level. Forecast accuracy does not improve 
significantly more for voluntary adopters relative to non-adopters. The coefficient on Mandatory 
IFRS * Mandatory is statistically greater than the coefficient on Voluntary IFRS * Mandatory at 
the 10 percent level in columns (1), (2), and (4). This result suggests that the decrease in forecast 
errors is reliably greater for mandatory adopters relative to voluntary adopters for most forecast 
horizons. 
[Insert Table 5] 
In summary, we find that the information environment improves for mandatory adopters. 
Macroeconomic factors and not IFRS adoption can cause the decrease in forecast errors, thereby 
casting doubt on whether IFRS causes the improvement in the information environment. However, 
these factors should affect the three groups of firms on average uniformly and therefore this 
argument fails to explain why we observe a higher improvement in transparency for mandatory 
                                                 
9 Readers should interpret the decomposition of consensus to common and idiosyncratic precision with care. As Barron et 
al. (1998) note, the decomposition is valid if the following assumptions are satisfied: analysts issue unbiased forecasts, 
earnings  forecast  do  not  strictly  determine  earnings  realizations,  all  analysts’  idiosyncratic  information  is  of  equal 
precision, and forecast errors are equally distributed. We believe it may well be the case that the third assumption does not 
hold in our setting. 
10 We also rank transformed the idiosyncratic and common precision variables and estimated the effect of IFRS adoption 
on the ranking variables. The results were unchanged.    24 
adopters. Moreover, the inclusion of time-varying country, industry, and firm factors should 
mitigate concerns that other unrelated events systematically vary with the IFRS adoption samples 
and cause different behavior in our information environment measures.  
 
Firm-specific differences between IFRS and local GAAP 
If IFRS adoption has a direct effect on the information environment then the improvement in 
forecast accuracy should be higher for firms with larger reconciliation amounts. Table 6 confirms 
this prediction.  
[Insert Table 6] 
The sample includes 1,389 unique firms from 18 countries with available I/B/E/S and 
reconciliation data.
11 The first two columns include all 1,389 firms. The last two columns exclude 
427 UK firms, which heavily populate our sample, to ensure that the results are not driven only by 
UK firms. Columns (1) and (3) use raw values of the absolute deflated difference between Local 
GAAP and IFRS earnings. Columns (2) and (4) include rank values of this variable, ranging from 
one to five, where firms are assigned to quintiles. The interaction term GAAP Difference * 
Mandatory is negative and significant across all specifications and therefore forecast accuracy 
improves more for firms with domestic accounting practice diverging more from IFRS. 
 
Comparability and/or information effects 
Comparability effects  
Table 7, panel A provides summary statistics for the three groups of analysts and the firms that 
each group covers. Analysts with portfolios that move from Local to Multiple GAAP work in 
brokerage houses with on average 80 analysts; follow a firm for a little over three years; cover 12 
                                                 
11 The sample includes firms from the following countries: Austria 2, Belgium 39, Czech Republic 1, Denmark 40, Finland 
75, France 240, Greece 53, Ireland 27, Italy 109, Luxembourg 1, the Netherlands 85, Norway 57, Poland 6, Portugal 16, 
Spain 79, Sweden 115, Switzerland 17, and United Kingdom 427.   25 
firms; and five industries.
12 Average horizon of first (last) forecast is 163 (102) days. Analysts 
with portfolios that move from Local GAAP to IFRS work in brokerage houses with on average 54 
analysts, follow a firm for a little over three years, cover eight firms, and four industries. Average 
horizon of first (last) forecast is 173 (86) days. Analysts with portfolios that move from Multiple 
GAAP to IFRS work in brokerage houses with on average 88 analysts, follow a firm for a little 
over three years, cover nine firms, and four industries. Average horizon of first (last) forecast is 
171 (88) days. 
[Insert Table 7] 
  Table 7, panel B shows that consistent with a comparability effect, forecast accuracy 
improves more for analysts with portfolios that move from Local GAAP to IFRS and even more 
for analysts with portfolios that move from Multiple GAAP to IFRS. In the first (last) two 
columns, we use the first (last) forecast issued by each analyst within 250 days from fiscal year 
end. We use as a dependent variable both deflated and un-deflated absolute forecast errors. The 
coefficients on Local GAAP to IFRS * Mandatory and Multiple GAAP to IFRS * Mandatory are 
negative and, across all specifications, the latter is more negative than the former. Therefore, we 
find evidence consistent with Hypothesis 1. Forecast accuracy improves more for analysts that 
benefit more from increased accounting comparability after IFRS adoption.  
In unreported tests, we examine whether the three groups of analysts differ substantially 
in terms of the covered firms’ country institutions (enforcement, legal institutions etc.) or 
reconciliation magnitudes. If mandatory adopters covered by analysts with portfolios that move 
from Multiple GAAP to IFRS are incorporated in countries with stronger legal institutions or have 
larger reconciliation amounts then the results might be caused by enforcement or reconciliation 
amounts rather than comparability. However, in unreported results, we do not find any systematic 
                                                 
12 32 percent of analysts are classified in this category. Analysts in this group cover on average more companies than other 
analysts, which makes it more likely that one of their firms will not switch after mandatory adoption. Moreover, at the 
same time, these analysts cover significantly smaller firms compared to other analysts; smaller firms in many jurisdictions 
switched to IFRS later on (and not in 2005).   26 
differences that could bias our results in either way. When we include control variables for the 
quality of country institutions or reconciliation magnitudes all results remain unchanged. 
 
Information Effects 
Table 8, panel A shows summary statistics for analysts with portfolios that move from Multiple 
GAAP to IFRS. These analysts work for brokerage houses that employ on average 83 analysts, 
have a little more of three years of firm-specific experience, cover nine firms, and four industries. 
The sample includes 719 mandatory and 345 voluntary adopters. The sample of mandatory and 
voluntary adopters is comparable in terms of forecast horizon, reporting losses, firm size, and level 
of absolute accruals. 
[Insert Table 8] 
Table 8, panel B shows that consistent with an information effect, forecast accuracy 
improves more for mandatory than for voluntary adopters, for the set of analysts with portfolios 
that move from Multiple GAAP to IFRS. In the first (last) two columns, we use the first (last) 
forecast issued by each analyst within 250 days from fiscal year end. We use as dependent 
variable both deflated and un-deflated absolute forecast errors. The coefficient on Mandatory 
IFRS * Mandatory is negative and significant. This result is consistent with Hypothesis 2. The 
increase in forecast accuracy can be partly attributed to greater information quality after 
mandatory IFRS adoption. 
 
Are the findings a result of earnings management? 
Table 9 shows that the results are not likely to be the result of earnings management. The 
coefficient on the triple interaction term Mandatory IFRS * Mandatory * Absolute accruals is 
insignificant (panel A, column (1)). A negative and significant coefficient would be consistent 
with an earnings management explanation as it would indicate that the reduction in the forecast 
error after IFRS adoption is more pronounced for mandatory adopters that have large accruals and   27 
as a result more opportunities to manage earnings.  In unreported tests, we estimate discretionary 
accruals using the modified Jones model. We replace absolute accruals with absolute discretionary 
accruals in the regression. The results are similar to the ones reported above.  
[Insert Table 9] 
The second column examines how the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption varies with the 
percentage of analysts that issue a cash flow forecast for the firm. For the median firm, one out of 
three analysts with earnings forecasts also issue a cash flow forecast. The coefficient on the triple 
interaction term Mandatory IFRS * Mandatory * CF forecasts is insignificant (column (2)). A 
positive and significant coefficient would be consistent with an earnings management explanation, 
as it would indicate that the reduction in the forecast error after IFRS adoption is more pronounced 
for mandatory adopters where analysts do not forecast cash flows. 
Table 9 panel B shows that firms with larger absolute earnings reconciliations are no 
more likely to meet or beat the consensus earnings forecasts after mandatory IFRS adoption. To 
support the manipulation hypothesis, the coefficient on the interaction term, GAAP Difference * 
Mandatory, needed to be positive and significant. Instead it is negative and insignificant.
13 
Collectively, the results fail to support Hypothesis 3. The decrease in forecast errors is not driven 
by managers manipulating earnings to bring them closer to consensus forecasts.  
 
6.  Conclusion 
With more than 120 countries requiring or permitting the use of IFRS by publicly listed companies 
the question of whether such a global transition towards a single set of accounting standards has 
been met by the presumed benefits of higher information quality and accounting comparability 
still remains unanswered. To contribute to our knowledge in this important topic we investigate 
                                                 
13 In unreported results to control for the possibility that any cross-sectional variation we observe is due to the different 
levels of enforcement we include an enforcement proxy used in prior studies (Byard et al. 2011; Preiato et al. 2009; Cotter 
et al. 2010). The results are not sensitive to this inclusion. 
   28 
whether mandatory IFRS adoption improves firms’ information environment. We find that after 
the mandatory transition to IFRS, forecast accuracy and other measures of the quality of the 
information environment improve significantly more for mandatory adopters. Moreover, we find 
that the larger the difference between IFRS earnings and local GAAP earnings the larger is the 
improvement in forecast accuracy. This result increases our confidence that IFRS adoption causes 
the improvement in the information environment. 
More importantly, we provide evidence on whether the improvement in the information 
environment can be attributed to higher quality information and/or improved accounting 
comparability. We find results consistent with both information and comparability effects. 
Forecast accuracy improves more for analyst-firm pairs that are affected by either information or 
comparability benefits. We find no evidence suggesting that the increase in forecast accuracy is 
driven by earnings manipulation. 
A number of caveats apply to our analysis. First, as in any study that exploits time-series 
variation from an exogenous event, it is hard to unambiguously attribute causality to the observed 
effects. It is possible that correlated omitted variables are driving the results although we have 
tried to carefully isolate the effect of IFRS adoption. We tried to isolate the economic effect of 
IFRS adoption by considering all three categories of firms and by using several different 
identification strategies. Second, similar to previous research (Lang and Lundholm 1996; Healy, 
Hutton, and Palepu 1999), we rely on the analyst forecast characteristics to measure changes in the 
information environment. To the extent that these proxies are not appropriate one needs to be 
cautious in interpreting our evidence. 
We believe that these results have important implications for the debate on the globalization 
of accounting standards and for regulators that are considering a transition towards IFRS. 
Although we make no claim with regard to the net cost or benefit of adoption, we do highlight that 
the effects of IFRS compliance are not homogeneous for all firms (even within the same country).   29 
Importantly, we show that IFRS adoption is likely to generate both information and comparability 
effects and improve the quality of information intermediation in capital markets; a key market 
institution that facilitates efficient allocation of resources towards its most productive uses.   30 
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TABLE 1 
Sample composition by country and by accounting standard followed 
 
   All  Mandatory IFRS  Voluntary IFRS  U.S. GAAP 
Country  Firm-years  Unique firms  Firm-years  Unique firms  Firm-years  Unique firms  Firm-years  Unique firms 
ARGENTINA  15  3  0  0  0  0  0  0 
AUSTRALIA  1480  253  484  244  12  2  0  0 
AUSTRIA  175  32  20  7  131  25  13  5 
BELGIUM  382  69  121  49  88  19  7  3 
BERMUDA  86  16  0  0  14  2  71  14 
BRAZIL  552  91  0  0  0  0  0  0 
CANADA  2082  364  0  0  0  0  114  27 
CHILE  169  30  0  0  0  0  0  0 
CHINA  595  121  0  0  275  59  15  3 
CZECH REPUBLIC  30  5  3  2  21  3  0  0 
DENMARK  365  62  123  47  74  15  0  0 
EGYPT  31  7  0  0  0  0  0  0 
FINLAND  541  88  206  74  66  14  0  0 
FRANCE  1514  266  563  230  190  31  24  5 
GERMANY  1592  278  232  100  879  166  321  93 
GREECE  332  59  137  54  25  5  6  3 
HONG KONG  1073  189  482  181  46  8  12  3 
HUNGARY  62  10  2  1  58  9  0  0 
INDIA  603  117  0  0  0  0  6  2 
INDONESIA  295  49  0  0  0  0  0  0 
IRELAND  216  39  83  34  0  0  19  4 
ISRAEL  187  35  0  0  0  0  105  20 
ITALY  681  120  43  15  578  103  12  2 
JAPAN  5977  1032  0  0  0  0  258  47 
KOREA (SOUTH)  241  56  0  0  0  0  0  0 
LUXEMBOURG  52  9  6  2  22  5  19  4 
MALAYSIA  845  161  0  0  0  0  0  0 
MEXICO  308  49  0  0  0  0  0  0   37 
NETHERLANDS  701  113  252  95  55  9  77  17 
NEW ZEALAND  240  41  0  0  0  0  0  0 
NORWAY  440  77  197  74  10  2  28  8 
PERU  45  8  0  0  0  0  0  0 
PHILIPPINES  204  34  83  34  0  0  0  0 
POLAND  122  21  38  15  38  6  0  0 
PORTUGAL  162  25  57  21  18  4  0  0 
RUSSIA  93  20  0  0  45  10  40  9 
SINGAPORE  586  110  370  103  13  3  31  6 
SOUTH AFRICA  637  105  203  95  53  9  0  0 
SPAIN  515  83  220  80  0  0  2  1 
SWEDEN  770  129  335  125  17  3  7  1 
SWITZERLAND  903  146  66  25  593  100  81  16 
TAIWAN  582  111  0  0  0  0  4  1 
THAILAND  656  125  0  0  0  0  0  0 
TURKEY  293  54  0  0  100  21  0  0 
UNITED KINGDOM  3162  591  1158  528  7  2  16  4 
UNITED STATES  16617  2721  0  0  0  0  16617  2721 
TOTAL  47209  8124  5484  2235  3428  635  17905  3019 
 
This table shows the composition of the sample by country and by accounting standard. We refer to Hong Kong as a country in our analyses, although, more 
appropriately, it has the status of a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People’s Republic of China. Voluntary IFRS includes firms that adopted IFRS 
before it was mandated in its country. Mandatory IFRS includes firms that adopt IFRS when their country mandated IFRS reporting. U.S. GAAP includes firms 
reporting their primary financial statements under U.S. GAAP. The sample includes only countries with at least 10 firm-year observations.   38 
TABLE 2 
Panel A: Summary statistics for variables used in regression analysis 
 
Dependent variables  Mean  STD  Q3  Median  Q1 
Error (deflated)  0.334  0.596  0.317  0.107  0.036 
Error (non-deflated)  2.873  7.959  0.940  0.140  0.040 
Dispersion  0.148  0.222  0.152  0.065  0.027 
Consensus  0.585  0.351  0.919  0.681  0.244 
Common precision  112.910  243.126  75.623  9.073  0.747 
Idiosyncratic precision  190.816  475.320  77.836  6.091  0.318 
Independent variables           
Absolute accruals  0.042  0.043  0.055  0.036  0.019 
Analyst coverage  7.397  6.484  10.000  5.000  3.000 
Firm size  8.108  2.808  9.864  7.684  6.064 
Loss  0.137  0.344  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Forecast horizon  73.576  2.081  75.000  73.000  72.000 
ADR  0.095  0.293  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 
Panel B: Summary statistics by type of IFRS adoption 
Mandatory adopters  Mean  STD  Q3  Median  Q1 
Absolute accruals  0.043  0.042  0.057  0.037  0.018 
Analyst coverage  7.370  6.659  10.000  5.000  2.000 
Firm size  7.358  2.340  8.879  7.159  5.662 
Loss  0.103  0.304  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Voluntary adopters           
Absolute accruals  0.046  0.037  0.060  0.041  0.024 
Analyst coverage  8.807  8.242  12.000  6.000  3.000 
Firm size  7.667  2.438  9.177  7.555  5.890 
Loss  0.141  0.348  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Non-adopters           
Absolute accruals  0.042  0.043  0.053  0.034  0.019 
Analyst coverage  7.237  6.140  10.000  5.000  3.000 
Firm size  8.070  2.954  10.429  7.653  6.291   39 
Loss  0.130  0.307  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Non-adopters (excl. U.S.)           
Absolute accruals  0.042  0.039  0.053  0.035  0.020 
Analyst coverage  6.573  5.630  9.000  5.000  2.000 
Firm size  7.827  2.116  10.259  7.360  6.907 
Loss  0.122  0.327  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Non-adopters (from mandatory countries)           
Absolute accruals  0.047  0.040  0.058  0.038  0.023 
Analyst coverage  8.108  9.060  13.000  4.000  1.000 
Firm size  6.378  2.484  8.336  6.216  4.587 
Loss  0.214  0.410  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 
 
Error (deflated) is the absolute difference between consensus forecast and actual earnings, divided by absolute actual earnings.  Error (non-deflated) is the 
absolute difference between consensus forecast and actual earnings. Dispersion is the standard deviation of individual analyst forecasts for a firm i in year t 
divided by absolute actual earnings. Consensus is a measure of the commonality in analysts’ information, as captured by the across-analyst correlation in forecast 
errors (Barron, Byard and Kim 2002). Common precision is a measure of the precision of common information in individual analyst forecasts (Barron et al. 
2002). Idiosyncratic precision is a measure of the precision of idiosyncratic information in individual analyst forecasts (Barron et al. 2002). Absolute accruals is 
the absolute difference between net income and cash flows, divided by total assets. Analyst coverage is the number of analysts providing earnings forecasts for a 
firm. Firm size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Loss is an indicator variable if a firm is reporting negative net income. Forecast horizon is the number of 
days between consensus forecast and end of forecasting period. ADR is an indicator variable if firm i in year t trades ADR in the United States. 
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TABLE 3 
Effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on information environment – Varying the sample 
Sample  All firms  Ex U.S.  Ex 2005  Ex 2001-2002  Mandatory countries  Ex Singapore 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Dependent variable  Error (deflated) 
Parameter  Estimate  t  Estimate  t  Estimate  t  Estimate  t  Estimate  t  Estimate  t 
Intercept  -0.4520  -5.02  -0.3011  -2.23  -0.5400  -5.45  -0.3880  -3.75  -0.3034  -1.73  -0.3996  -4.42 
Mandatory  0.0070  0.98  -0.0122  -1.13  0.0105  1.30  0.0000  -0.01  -0.0147  -0.75  0.0041  0.58 
Voluntary IFRS * Mandatory  -0.0398  -1.86  -0.0227  -1.03  -0.0581  -2.52  -0.0062  -0.28  -0.0216  -0.75  -0.0404  -1.88 
Mandatory IFRS * Mandatory  -0.0474  -4.32  -0.0343  -2.80  -0.0572  -4.44  -0.0357  -2.90  -0.0303  -1.99  -0.0494  -4.36 
Absolute accruals  -0.2807  -6.74  -0.2875  -4.97  -0.2815  -6.07  -0.1622  -2.66  -0.3723  -4.49  -0.2737  -6.53 
U.S. GAAP  0.0680  13.44  -0.0350  -2.95  0.0710  11.39  0.0728  10.46  -0.0570  -2.48  0.0676  13.40 
Analyst coverage  -0.0010  -4.17  -0.0011  -3.40  -0.0011  -4.00  -0.0012  -3.57  -0.0013  -3.02  -0.0009  -4.07 
Firm size  0.0064  11.39  0.0054  8.62  0.0073  10.11  0.0065  6.95  0.0076  6.26  0.0063  11.30 
Loss  0.2997  26.96  0.3879  24.00  0.2942  25.03  0.3082  23.48  0.3556  16.01  0.2998  26.89 
Forecast horizon  0.0023  2.03  0.0005  0.27  0.0033  2.60  0.0014  1.11  0.0004  0.16  0.0017  1.45 
ADR  -0.0174  -5.58  -0.0018  -0.48  -0.0076  -1.62  -0.0282  -3.82  -0.0025  -0.47  -0.0171  -5.39 
Industry-year benchmark  0.1064  3.93  0.0955  2.49  0.1206  4.07  0.1432  3.69  0.1755  3.28  0.1008  3.72 
Country-year benchmark  0.4542  21.12  0.4543  18.30  0.4470  19.38  0.4795  15.30  0.4305  12.22  0.4527  20.72 
Firm effects  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
Adj R-squared  38.8%    39.0%    38.8%    37.1%    40.1%    38.7%   
N  47,209    30,592    39,898    35,284    16,697    46,623   
 
This table presents OLS specifications testing the effect of IFRS adoption on forecast errors. ‘All firms’ includes the firms in Table 1. ‘Excl. U.S.’ excludes U.S. 
firms. ‘Excl. 2005’ excludes forecasts made for the fiscal year of 2005. ‘Excl. 2001-2002’ excludes all forecasts made for fiscal years 2001 and 2002. 
‘Mandatory countries’ includes only forecasts made for firms in countries that mandated IFRS. ‘Excl. Singapore’ excludes all firms from Singapore. Dependent 
variable is Error (deflated), which is the absolute difference between consensus forecast and actual earnings, divided by absolute actual earnings. Voluntary IFRS 
is an indicator variable for a firm that adopted IFRS before it was mandated in its country. Mandatory IFRS is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for 
a firm that adopts IFRS when its country mandated IFRS. Mandatory is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for periods on or after 2005 (2003 for 
Singapore). U.S. GAAP is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if a firm reports under U.S. GAAP. Industry-year benchmark is the average level of the 
dependent variable by year for each of the 49 Fama-French (1996) industries. Country-year benchmark is the average level of the dependent variable by year for 
each country. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm and year level. All other variable definitions are provided in Table 2.  41 
TABLE 4 
Effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on information environment – Varying the dependent variable 
 
Dependent variable  Error (non-deflated)  Dispersion  Consensus  Common precision  Idiosyncratic precision 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Parameter  Estimate  t  Estimate  t  Estimate  t  Estimate  t  Estimate  t 
Intercept  -2.4920  -3.68  -0.0767  -2.26  -0.6969  -11.37  21.1478  0.58  88.4537  1.17 
Mandatory  0.0527  0.85  -0.0055  -2.20  0.0140  3.28  -18.2047  -6.49  -26.5746  -4.56 
Voluntary IFRS * Mandatory  -0.2306  -1.80  -0.0256  -2.96  0.0015  0.12  24.7885  5.37  21.4534  2.23 
Mandatory IFRS * Mandatory  -0.2330  -2.49  -0.0129  -3.17  -0.0215  -2.98  19.0527  5.35  32.5467  4.39 
Absolute accruals  -0.8379  -2.23  -0.1044  -6.80  0.0054  0.20  -4.7230  -0.43  -9.1444  -0.40 
U.S. GAAP  0.1017  4.23  0.0310  15.87  -0.0284  -12.31  -12.8968  -10.76  -18.8442  -9.81 
Analyst coverage  0.0042  2.35  -0.0003  -2.80  -0.0008  -5.68  -0.3540  -4.48  -0.1634  -0.98 
Firm size  0.0573  10.58  0.0012  6.11  0.0012  4.34  -0.1178  -0.83  -0.4663  -1.56 
Loss  1.9249  20.85  0.0539  13.30  0.0632  16.76  -22.0241  -16.10  -37.4354  -14.64 
Forecast horizon  0.0172  1.97  -0.0003  -0.80  0.0030  3.72  -0.3275  -0.68  -1.3330  -1.32 
ADR  -0.1179  -5.86  -0.0060  -5.23  0.0088  6.10  4.0532  6.90  4.5297  4.32 
Industry-year benchmark  0.1036  4.70  0.2033  9.72  0.2153  6.32  0.1234  9.23  0.1349  6.86 
Country-year benchmark  0.0340  8.18  0.4166  25.26  0.6057  21.87  0.1187  13.83  0.1103  11.55 
Firm effects  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
Adj R-squared  74.1%    44.4%    26.1%    53.6%    43.4%   
N  47,209    41,028    40,951    40,951    40,951   
 
This table presents OLS specifications testing the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on measures of information environment quality. Error (non-deflated) is the 
absolute difference between consensus forecast and actual earnings. Dispersion is the standard deviation of individual analyst forecasts divided by absolute actual 
earnings. Consensus is a measure of the commonality in analysts’ information, as captured by the across-analyst correlation in forecast errors (Barron et al. 
2002). Common precision is a measure of the precision of common information in individual analyst forecasts (Barron et al. 2002). Idiosyncratic precision is a 
measure of the precision of idiosyncratic information in individual analyst forecasts (Barron et al. 2002). Voluntary IFRS is an indicator variable for a firm that 
adopted IFRS before it was mandated in its country. Mandatory IFRS is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for a firm that adopts IFRS when its 
country mandated IFRS reporting. Mandatory is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for periods on or after 2005 (2003 for Singapore). Industry-year   42 
benchmark is the average level of the dependent variable by year for each of the 49 Fama-French (1996) industries. Country-year benchmark is the average level 
of the dependent variable by year for each country. All other variable definitions are provided in Table 2. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and 
clustered at the firm and year level.   43 
TABLE 5 
Effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on information environment – Varying the forecast horizon 
 
Sample  Horizon 40 days  Horizon 100 days  Horizon 160 days  Horizon 220 days 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent variable  Error (deflated) 
Parameter  Estimate  t  Estimate  t  Estimate  t  Estimate  t 
Intercept  -0.1801  -4.22  -0.3630  -4.59  -0.6696  -5.65  -0.8941  -6.05 
Mandatory  0.0030  0.50  0.0022  0.32  0.0012  0.17  0.0070  0.92 
Voluntary IFRS * Mandatory  -0.0377  -1.83  -0.0332  -1.48  -0.0366  -1.43  -0.0121  -0.42 
Mandatory IFRS * Mandatory  -0.0508  -4.73  -0.0500  -4.21  -0.0389  -2.94  -0.0433  -2.90 
Absolute accruals  -0.2380  -6.48  -0.2953  -6.97  -0.3741  -7.41  -0.3086  -5.45 
U.S. GAAP  0.0715  14.16  0.0645  12.25  0.0671  11.39  0.0804  12.66 
Analyst coverage  -0.0010  -4.74  -0.0009  -3.51  -0.0002  -0.86  0.0002  0.55 
Firm size  0.0057  11.53  0.0079  13.10  0.0070  10.03  0.0063  7.91 
Loss  0.2539  25.43  0.3121  26.55  0.3758  28.49  0.3985  28.02 
Forecast horizon  -0.0016  -1.58  0.0004  0.55  0.0017  2.48  0.0020  3.08 
ADR  -0.0184  -6.34  -0.0199  -5.92  -0.0217  -5.56  -0.0283  -6.78 
Industry-year benchmark  0.1192  4.27  0.1460  5.78  0.1560  7.11  0.1541  6.75 
Country-year benchmark  0.4528  21.50  0.4685  21.12  0.4982  21.25  0.5619  22.93 
Firm effects  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
Adj R-squared  38.4%    39.8%    41.5%    42.6%   
N  48,067    45,301    43,069    38,893   
 
This table presents OLS specifications testing the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on forecast errors. Horizon 40 days includes forecasts on average 40 days 
away from the end of the fiscal period. Horizon 100 days includes forecasts on average 100 days away from the end of the fiscal period. Horizon 160 days 
includes forecasts on average 160 days away from the end of the fiscal period. Horizon 220 days includes forecasts on average 220 days away from the end of the 
fiscal period. Dependent variable is Error (deflated), which is the absolute difference between consensus forecast and actual earnings, divided by absolute actual 
earnings. Voluntary IFRS is an indicator variable for a firm that adopted IFRS before it was mandated in its country. Mandatory IFRS is an indicator variable that 
takes the value of one for a firm that adopts IFRS when its country mandated IFRS reporting. Mandatory is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for 
periods on or after 2005 (2003 for Singapore),. Industry-year benchmark is the average level of the dependent variable by year for each of the 49 Fama-French   44 
(1996) industries. Country-year benchmark is the average level of the dependent variable by year for each country. All other variable definitions are provided in 
Table 2. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm and year level.   45 
TABLE 6 
Effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on information environment –Firm-specific differences between IFRS and local GAAP 
 
Sample  Mandatory adopters  Mandatory adopters excl. UK 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent variable  Error (deflated) 
Parameter  Estimate  t  Estimate  t  Estimate  t  Estimate  t 
Intercept  -0.3119  -1.30  -0.3274  -1.36  0.4527  1.24  0.4354  1.19 
Mandatory  -0.0288  -1.51  0.0739  2.32  -0.0500  -1.99  0.0419  1.11 
GAAP Difference  0.0091  3.15  0.0237  4.84  0.0095  2.71  0.0211  3.66 
GAAP Difference * Mandatory  -0.0133  -2.19  -0.0413  -4.36  -0.0130  -1.98  -0.0375  -3.26 
Absolute accruals  -0.2530  -2.05  -0.2825  -2.35  -0.4311  -3.08  -0.4472  -3.23 
U.S. GAAP  -0.1987  -2.98  -0.1836  -2.80  -0.1904  -2.83  -0.1781  -2.69 
Analyst coverage  -0.0021  -3.01  -0.0019  -2.78  -0.0009  -1.25  -0.0007  -0.99 
Firm size  0.0065  3.14  0.0060  2.91  0.0031  1.49  0.0027  1.27 
Loss  0.3487  11.05  0.3459  10.99  0.3644  10.38  0.3610  10.27 
Forecast horizon  0.0008  0.25  0.0003  0.10  -0.0091  -1.96  -0.0095  -2.03 
ADR  0.0092  1.16  0.0078  0.99  0.0037  0.39  0.0019  0.20 
Industry-year benchmark  0.1782  2.41  0.1773  2.40  0.1233  1.39  0.1254  1.42 
Country-year benchmark  0.4420  7.98  0.4329  7.86  0.4563  7.75  0.4447  7.60 
Firm effects  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
Adj R-squared  41.2%    41.3%    42.7%    42.7%   
N  8,168    8,168    5,709    5,709   
 
This  table  presents  OLS  specifications  testing  the  effect  of  mandatory  IFRS  adoption  on  forecast  errors.  Mandatory  adopters  includes  all  firms  that  are 
mandatory adopters of IFRS with available IFRS reconciliation and IBES data. Mandatory adopter’s excl. UK includes all firms that are mandatory adopters of 
IFRS with available IFRS reconciliation and IBES data outside the United Kingdom. The first and third column use raw values of GAAP difference. The second 
and third column use rank values (ranging from one to five) of GAAP difference. Dependent variable is Error (deflated), which is the absolute difference between 
consensus forecast and actual earnings, divided by absolute actual earnings. Mandatory is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for periods on or after 
2005. GAAP difference is the absolute difference between IFRS earnings and local GAAP earnings, as published in the reconciliation documents of first time 
adopters in 2005, divided by the absolute local GAAP earnings. Industry-year benchmark is the average level of the dependent variable by year for each of the 49   46 
Fama-French (1996) industries. Country-year benchmark is the average level of the dependent variable by year for each country.  All other variable definitions are 
provided in Table 2. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm and year level.   47 
TABLE 7 
Panel A: Summary statistics by analyst classification 
 
Analyst group  From Local to Multiple GAAP  From Local GAAP to IFRS  From Multiple GAAP to IFRS 
# of observations  8152  2874  9538 
# of unique firms  1009  384  719 
# of unique analysts  426  197  706 
Statistic  Mean  STD  Mean  STD  Mean  STD 
Error (deflated) -(First forecast)  0.406  1.196  0.484  1.327  0.495  1.389 
Error (non-deflated) - (First forecast)  2.784  13.008  2.765  13.346  2.272  18.110 
Error (deflated) - (Last forecast)  0.339  1.090  0.381  1.161  0.427  1.316 
Error (non-deflated) - (Last forecast)  2.460  13.117  2.560  13.275  2.166  18.313 
Brokerage house size  79.724  89.655  53.781  67.617  87.895  85.747 
Experience  3.280  1.771  3.351  1.820  3.362  1.786 
# of firms covered  12.142  6.907  8.261  4.056  8.711  3.959 
# of industries covered  4.865  3.297  3.884  2.697  3.584  2.527 
Forecast horizon (First forecast)  163.619  54.298  173.888  57.453  171.348  57.853 
Forecast horizon (Last forecast)  101.904  49.598  86.132  49.969  87.767  51.740 
Loss  0.052  0.223  0.045  0.208  0.074  0.262 
Firm size  7.272  2.189  9.111  2.347  9.024  2.457 
Absolute accruals  0.041  0.038  0.037  0.037  0.045  0.037 
 
 
Panel A presents summary statistics for three groups of analysts. From Local GAAP to IFRS includes analysts, whose portfolios had firms following a single 
GAAP and after mandatory IFRS adoption all firms in their portfolio follow IFRS. From Multiple GAAP to IFRS includes analysts, whose portfolios had firms 
following different GAAP and after mandatory IFRS adoption all firms in their portfolio follow IFRS. The sample includes only mandatory IFRS adopters. A 
firm-analyst pair is included in the sample only if it appears both before and after mandatory IFRS adoption. First forecast uses the first forecast made by an 
analyst for a firm within 240 days (but not less than 30 days) from the end of the fiscal year. Last forecast uses the last forecast made by an analyst for a firm 
within 240 days (but not less than 30 days) from the end of the fiscal year. Error (deflated) is the absolute difference between actual earnings and individual 
forecast deflated by absolute actual earnings. Error (non-deflated) is the absolute difference between actual earnings and individual forecast. Brokerage house   48 
size is the number of analysts working for the brokerage house of the focal analyst. Experience is the number of years the analyst has been following a firm. # of 
firms covered is the number of firms an analyst is covering in a year. # of industries covered is the number of industries an analyst is covering in a year, based on 
the Fama-French industry classification. All other variable definitions are provided in Table 2.   49 
Panel B: Mandatory IFRS adoption and information environment: effect of accounting comparability 
 
Sample  First forecast  Last forecast 
Dependent variable  Error (deflated)  Error (non-deflated)  Error (deflated)  Error (non-deflated) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Parameter  Estimate  t  Estimate  t  Estimate  t  Estimate  t 
Intercept  -0.6776  -3.55  -6.9735  -3.26  -0.7122  -3.32  -6.4635  -2.92 
Local GAAP to IFRS  0.1174  1.67  1.7905  2.52  0.0580  0.84  1.9157  2.55 
Multiple GAAP to IFRS  0.1594  1.91  2.9558  2.59  0.1524  1.79  3.1900  2.64 
Mandatory  0.2127  3.69  2.8673  3.16  0.2535  3.37  3.2846  3.02 
Local GAAP to IFRS * Mandatory  -0.1104  -1.45  -1.2665  -2.09  -0.0807  -1.26  -1.5294  -2.25 
Multiple GAAP to IFRS * Mandatory  -0.1798  -1.92  -3.2341  -3.32  -0.1713  -1.74  -3.4268  -3.36 
Forecast horizon  0.0008  5.55  0.0035  2.02  0.0005  2.37  -0.0017  -0.80 
Brokerage house size  -0.0003  -2.85  -0.0044  -2.27  -0.0003  -2.77  -0.0046  -2.30 
Experience  0.0003  0.03  -0.0056  -0.04  0.0023  0.31  -0.0245  -0.17 
# of firms covered  0.0010  0.39  -0.0945  -1.73  0.0001  0.05  -0.1123  -1.92 
# of industries covered  -0.0033  -0.56  0.1832  2.00  -0.0026  -0.52  0.1898  1.97 
Loss  1.2160  9.48  3.8639  3.30  0.9349  8.67  3.6152  2.91 
Firm size  -0.0027  -0.27  0.3140  1.90  0.0059  0.60  0.3185  1.86 
Absolute accruals  -0.2979  -0.66  6.6745  0.90  -0.0985  -0.24  7.4445  0.98 
Industry-year benchmark  0.8273  5.00  0.0191  1.42  1.0935  4.78  0.0231  1.41 
Country-year benchmark  0.8573  4.52  1.3058  4.92  0.9431  3.85  1.4098  4.48 
Adj R-squared  11.2%    13.8%    9.8%    12.6%   
N  20,564    20,564    20,564    20,564   
Panel B presents OLS specifications testing the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on forecast errors for three groups of anal ysts. From Local GAAP to IFRS 
includes analysts, whose portfolios had firms following a single GAAP and after mandatory IFRS adoption all firms in their portfolio follow IFRS.  From 
Multiple GAAP to IFRS includes analysts, whose portfolios had firms following different GAAP and after mandatory IFRS adoption all firms in their portfolio 
follow IFRS. From Local to Multiple GAAP includes analysts, whose portfolios had firms following a single GAAP and after mandatory IFRS adoption some 
firms in their portfolio follow IFRS and other firms Local or U.S. GAAP (omitted group). The sample includes only mandatory IFRS adopters. A firm-analyst 
pair is included in the sample only if it appears both before and after mandatory IFRS adoption. First forecast uses the first forecast made by an analyst for a firm   50 
within 240 days (but not less than 30 days) from the end of the fiscal year. Last forecast uses the last forecast made by an analyst for a firm within 240 days (but 
not less than 30 days) from the end of the fiscal year. Error (deflated) is the absolute difference between actual earnings and individual forecast deflated by 
absolute actual earnings. Error (non-deflated) is the absolute difference between actual earnings and individual forecast. Brokerage house size is the number of 
analysts working for the brokerage house of the focal analyst. Experience is the number of years the analyst has been following a firm. # of firms covered is the 
number of firms an analyst is covering in a year. # of industries covered is the number of industries an analyst is covering in a year, based on the Fama-French 
industry classification. Loss is an indicator variable if a firm is reporting negative net income. Industry-year benchmark is the average level of the dependent 
variable by year for each of the 49 Fama-French (1996) industries. Country-year benchmark is the average level of the dependent variable by year for each 
country. All other variable definitions are provided in Table 2. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level.   51 
TABLE 8 
Panel A: Summary statistics by firm classification for analyst portfolios that change from Multiple GAAP to 
IFRS 
Analyst group    From Multiple GAAP to IFRS   
# of observations    14147   
# of unique firms    1064   
# of unique analysts    776   
Statistic    Mean  STD   
Brokerage house size    83.44  83.65   
Experience    3.35  1.78   
# of firms covered    8.68  4.04   
# of industries covered    3.66  2.50   
Firm group  Mandatory adopters  Voluntary adopters 
# of observations  9538  4609 
# of unique firms  719  345 
Statistic  Mean  STD  Mean  STD 
Error (deflated) -(First forecast)  0.495  1.389  0.431  1.054 
Error (non-deflated) - (First forecast)  2.272  18.111  2.345  22.340 
Error (deflated) - (Last forecast)  0.427  1.316  0.345  0.942 
Error (non-deflated) - (Last forecast)  2.166  18.313  1.849  18.594 
Forecast horizon (First forecast)  171.348  57.853  169.576  58.359 
Forecast horizon (Last forecast)  87.768  51.748  86.206  53.001 
Loss  0.074  0.262  0.069  0.254 
Firm size  9.024  2.457  8.825  2.089 
Absolute accruals  0.045  0.037  0.043  0.028 
Panel A presents summary statistics. From Multiple GAAP to IFRS includes analysts, whose portfolios had firms 
following different GAAP and after mandatory IFRS adoption all firms in their portfolio follow IFRS. The 
sample includes voluntary and mandatory IFRS adopters. A firm-analyst pair is included in the sample only if it 
appears both before and after mandatory IFRS adoption. First forecast uses the first forecast made by an analyst 
for a firm within 240 days (but not less than 30 days) from the end of the fiscal year. Last forecast uses the last 
forecast made by an analyst for a firm within 240 days (but not less than 30 days) from the end of the fiscal year. 
Error (deflated) is the absolute difference between actual earnings and individual forecast deflated by absolute 
actual earnings. Error (non-deflated) is the absolute difference between actual earnings and individual forecast. 
Brokerage house size is the number of analysts working for the brokerage house of the focal analyst. Experience 
is the number of years the analyst has been following a firm. # of firms covered is the number of firms an analyst 
is covering in a year. # of industries covered is the number of industries an analyst is covering in a year, based on 
the Fama-French industry classification. All other variable definitions are provided in Table 2.   52 
Panel B: Mandatory IFRS adoption and information environment: information effect  
 
Sample  First forecast  Last forecast 
Dependent variable  Error   Error  
(non-deflated) 
Error  
(deflated) 
Error  
(non-deflated)    (deflated) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Parameter  Estimate  t  Estimate  t  Estimate  t  Estimate  t 
Intercept  -0.3912  -1.61  -3.4213  -1.41  -0.5183  -1.89  -3.1698  -1.35 
Mandatory IFRS  0.1916  2.02  1.7946  1.83  0.1874  2.08  1.9063  2.04 
Mandatory  0.1791  2.52  1.0633  1.86  0.2352  2.72  0.9659  1.58 
Mandatory IFRS * Mandatory  -0.2079  -2.00  -1.5136  -1.92  -0.1912  -1.98  -1.3139  -1.74 
Forecast horizon  0.0006  3.47  0.0022  1.11  0.0004  2.07  0.0036  1.16 
Brokerage house size  -0.0004  -2.51  -0.0040  -1.41  -0.0004  -3.05  -0.0040  -1.48 
Experience  0.0103  0.94  -0.0838  -0.43  0.0119  1.17  -0.1079  -0.51 
# of firms covered  -0.0006  -0.14  0.0096  0.21  -0.0011  -0.28  -0.0095  -0.27 
# of industries covered  -0.0018  -0.21  -0.0263  -0.57  -0.0041  -0.57  -0.0133  -0.27 
Loss  1.0731  8.32  2.2888  2.27  0.7142  6.83  1.7080  1.70 
Firm size  -0.0160  -1.34  0.1886  0.81  -0.0095  -0.86  0.1515  0.64 
Absolute accruals  -0.3251  -0.51  10.6378  0.75  0.2705  0.45  10.1576  0.76 
Industry-year benchmark  0.3986  2.84  -0.0039  -0.19  0.6357  3.31  0.0105  0.45 
Country-year benchmark  0.9893  3.82  1.0461  2.87  1.1755  3.07  1.1003  3.50 
Adj R-squared  10.4%    26.8%    8.3%    23.5%   
N  14,147    14,147    14,147    14,147   
Panel B presents OLS specifications testing the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on forecast errors for two 
groups of firms. From Multiple GAAP to IFRS includes analysts, whose portfolios had firms following different 
GAAP and after mandatory IFRS adoption all firms in their portfolio follow IFRS. The sample includes only 
voluntary and mandatory IFRS adopters. A firm-analyst pair is included in the sample only if it appears both 
before and after mandatory IFRS adoption. Error (deflated) is the absolute difference between actual earnings 
and individual forecast deflated by absolute actual earnings. First forecast uses the first forecast made by an 
analyst for a firm within 240 days (but not less than 30 days) from the end of the fiscal year. Last forecast uses 
the last forecast made by an analyst for a firm within 240 days (but not less than 30 days) from the end of the 
fiscal year. Error (non-deflated) is the absolute difference between actual earnings and individual forecast. 
Forecast horizon is the number of days between consensus forecast and fiscal year end. Brokerage house size is 
the number of analysts working for the brokerage house of the focal analyst. Experience is the number of years 
the analyst has been following a firm. # of firms covered is the number of firms an analyst is covering in a year. # 
of industries covered is the number of industries an analyst is covering in a year, based on the Fama-French 
industry classification. Industry-year benchmark is the average level of the dependent variable by year for each   53 
of the 49 Fama-French (1996) industries. Country-year benchmark is the average level of the dependent variable 
by year for each country. All other variable definitions are provided in Table 2. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level.  54 
TABLE 9 
Panel A: Effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on forecast errors and earnings management 
 
Dependent variable  Error (deflated) 
   (1)  (2) 
Parameter  Estimate  t  Estimate  t 
Intercept  -0.4520  -5.02  -0.4526  -5.03 
Mandatory  0.0070  0.98  0.0069  0.96 
Voluntary IFRS * Mandatory  -0.0384  -1.44  -0.0161  -0.69 
Mandatory IFRS * Mandatory  -0.0474  -3.70  -0.0392  -3.16 
Absolute accruals  -0.2799  -6.19  -0.2810  -6.73 
Voluntary IFRS * Mandatory*Absolute accruals  -0.0373  -0.11     
Mandatory IFRS * Mandatory*Absolute accruals  0.0001  0.00     
CF forecasts      0.0020  0.63 
Voluntary IFRS * Mandatory*CF forecasts      -0.0240  -2.09 
Mandatory IFRS * Mandatory*CF forecasts      -0.0073  -1.17 
U.S. GAAP  0.0680  13.44  0.0693  13.16 
Analyst coverage  -0.0010  -4.17  -0.0010  -4.49 
Firm size  0.0064  11.38  0.0064  11.46 
Loss  0.2997  26.95  0.3000  26.97 
Forecast horizon  0.0023  2.03  0.0023  2.02 
ADR  -0.0174  -5.57  -0.0177  -5.65 
Industry-year benchmark  0.1064  3.93  0.1058  3.91 
Country-year benchmark  0.4542  21.12  0.4552  21.18 
Firm effects  Yes    Yes   
Adj R-squared  38.8%    38.8%   
N  47,209    47,209   
 
This  table  presents  OLS  specifications  testing  the  effect  of  mandatory  IFRS  adoption  on  forecast  errors 
conditional on earnings management variables. Dependent variable is Error (deflated), which is the absolute 
difference between consensus forecast and actual earnings, divided by absolute actual earnings. Voluntary IFRS 
is an indicator variable for a firm that adopted IFRS before it was mandated in its country. Mandatory IFRS is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of one for a firm that adopts IFRS when its country mandated IFRS. 
Mandatory is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for periods on or after 2005 (2003 for Singapore). 
CF forecasts is the number of analysts that forecast cash flow per share divided by the number of analyst that 
forecast earnings per share. U.S. GAAP is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if a firm reports under 
U.S. GAAP. Industry-year benchmark is the average level of the dependent variable by year for each of the 49 
Fama-French (1996) industries. Country-year benchmark is the average level of the dependent variable by year   55 
for  each  country.  All  other  variable  definitions  are  provided  in  Table  2.  Standard  errors  are  robust  to 
heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm and year level.   56 
TABLE 9 
Panel B: Effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on the probability of meeting or beating analyst forecasts. 
Sample  Mandatory adopters  Mandatory adopters excl. UK 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent variable  Error (deflated) 
Parameter  Estimate  p-value  Estimate  p-value  Estimate  p-value  Estimate  p-value 
Intercept  4.3101  0.064  4.4395  0.026  4.6361  0.191  5.7823  0.059 
Mandatory  -0.4728  0.011  -0.4263  0.007  -0.4833  0.054  -0.4775  0.026 
GAAP Difference  0.0316  0.156  0.0386  0.048  0.0358  0.122  0.0422  0.044 
GAAP Difference * Mandatory  -0.0458  0.126  -0.0284  0.261  -0.0486  0.114  -0.0386  0.148 
Absolute accruals  -3.5092  0.122  -1.6658  0.376  -4.9180  0.048  -2.2782  0.239 
U.S. GAAP  1.3936  0.149  0.9621  0.331  0.6045  0.569  0.1245  0.909 
Analyst coverage  0.0601  <.0001  0.0626  <.0001  0.0398  0.004  0.0433  0.000 
Firm size  -0.2521  <.0001  -0.2574  <.0001  -0.3011  <.0001  -0.3245  <.0001 
Loss  -0.5858  0.021  -0.9536  <.0001  -0.4487  0.073  -0.8386  0.000 
Forecast horizon  -0.0615  0.029  -0.0555  0.022  -0.0494  0.257  -0.0550  0.144 
ADR  0.0200  0.942  0.0210  0.924  0.5296  0.064  0.5678  0.012 
Industry-year benchmark  3.2784  <.0001  3.6022  <.0001  2.4881  0.012  -2.9143  0.000 
Country-year benchmark  0.8596  0.215  0.8486  0.134  -0.2004  0.761  -0.2110  0.690 
Firm effects  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
Adj. R-squared  4.07%    5.21%    6.67%    7.91%   
N  8,168     8,168     5,709     5,709    
This table presents a logistic specification testing the likelihood of meeting or beating analyst forecasts following mandatory adoption of IFRS. The dependent 
variable takes the value of one if the realized earnings are equal to or greater by one cent per share of the analyst’s forecast (columns 1 and 3). As a sensitivity 
analysis we also present results where the dependent variable takes the value of one if realized earnings are equal to forecasted earnings or greater by at most 
three cents of the analyst’s forecast (columns 2 and 4). Mandatory adopters includes all firms that are mandatory adopters of IFRS with available IFRS 
reconciliation and IBES data. Mandatory adopter’s excl. UK includes all firms that are mandatory adopters of IFRS with available IFRS reconciliation and IBES   57 
data outside the United Kingdom. GAAP difference is the absolute difference between IFRS earnings and local GAAP earnings, as published in the reconciliation 
documents of first time adopters in 2005, divided by the absolute local GAAP earnings. U.S. GAAP is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if a firm 
reports under U.S. GAAP. Industry-year benchmark is the average level of the dependent variable by year for each of the 49 Fama-French (1996) industries. 
Country-year benchmark is the average level of the dependent variable by year for each country. All other variable definitions are provided in Table 2. Standard 
errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm and year level. 